Like-Minded: Externalism and Moral Psychology

The MIT Press (2011)
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Abstract

The debate has continued in these terms to the present day. In Like-Minded, Andrew Sneddon argues that "reason" and "passion" do not satisfactorily capture all the important options for explaining the psychological foundations of morality.

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Andrew Sneddon
University of Ottawa

Citations of this work

Varieties of the extended self.Richard Heersmink - 2020 - Consciousness and Cognition 85:103001.
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Ten questions concerning extended cognition.Robert A. Wilson - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):19-33.
Situated agency: towards an affordance-based, sensorimotor theory of action.Martin Weichold - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (4):761-785.

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