Vague Singulars, Semantic Indecision, and the Metaphysics of Persons

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (3):569-585 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Composite materialism, as I will understand it, is the view that human persons are composite material objects. This paper develops and investigates an argument, The Vague Singulars Argument, for the falsity of composite materialism. We shall see that cogent or not, the Vague Singulars Argument has philosophically significant ramifications.

Other Versions

No versions found

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
568 (#48,550)

6 months
129 (#40,441)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Donald Smith
Virginia Commonwealth University

References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Material Beings.Peter Van Inwagen - 1990 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.

View all 21 references / Add more references