Minimalism, truth-aptitude and belief

Analysis 54 (1):21-26 (1994)
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10.1093/analys/54.1.21

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Michael Smith
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Quasi-realism, negation and the Frege-Geach problem.Nicholas Unwin - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (196):337-352.
Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 (1):1-88.
Simplifying alethic pluralism.Douglas Edwards - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48.
Disciplined syntacticism and moral expressivism.James Lenman - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):32–57.

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