Abstract

The work of Michel Serres, if considered at all, is often presented as a radical break with or criticism of the work of Gaston Bachelard. The aim of this paper is to correct this image, by focusing on the early Hermes series by Serres. In these studies Serres still portrays himself as a follower of Bachelard, rather than an adversary. This is exemplarily shown in his neologism, i.e. the new new scientific spirit, referring to the attempt to update Bachelard in the light of more recent scientific developments. This shows how the roots of Serres’ philosophy lie not in a radical break with Bachelard, but must be understood rather as a Bachelardian criticism of Bachelard himself. This Bachelardian criticism consists in what could be called his surrationalism: the sciences do not follow the categories imposed by philosophers, but are always more flexible and open than these categories allow. The philosopher should follow this scientific flexibility, rather than trying to contain it in his or her categories. Instead of abandoning Bachelard’s perspective, Serres’ criticisms can therefore be understood as a radicalisation of Bachelard’s thought. Specific critiques of Serres, such as those concerning the novelty of Bachelard’s thought, the role of epistemology, the role of normativity, and finally the role of politics, and their consequences will be evaluated through a reappraisal of this Bachelardian move that underlies Serres’ criticism. Finally, this can also open a path to reassess the relation between Bachelard and Bruno Latour or Isabelle Stengers, who can be considered as followers of Serres.