The Absolute and the Failure to Think of the Ontological Difference Heidegger's Critique of Hegel

Studia Phaenomenologica 8:453-472 (2008)
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to examine Heidegger’s critique of Hegel and to determine whether it is justified. Heidegger claims that Hegel tries to reduce everything to a single absolute entity, to the absolute knowing subject. The result is the identification of being and nothing, as Hegel formulates it at the beginning of his Logic. Hegel identifies being with nothing because being has no references, no predicates, no properties. Heidegger agrees with Hegel that being and nothing are the same, but in completely different respects. They are the same because only entity actually exists, i.e. as an existent being. But Being itself does not exist, and should be conceived in an utterly different way from entity. And since Being cannot “be” it is a non-entity and therefore nothing

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Alon Segev
University of Illinois at Springfield

Citations of this work

Nishitani’s Critique of Hegel in Prajñā and Reason.Edward Kwok & Gregory S. Moss - 2024 - Journal of East Asian Philosophy 3 (1):115-143.

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