Abstract

In his theory of social freedom, Axel Honneth argues that freedom can only be realized in and through social cooperation. Accordingly, a theory of freedom must therefore start from an analysis of socially instituted forms of cooperation. This approach not only allows for a reconstruction of normative ideals within modern institutions but also aims at revealing obstacles to their full realization. However, in contrast to his earlier theory of recognition, Honneth now assumes that problematic social developments do not necessarily result in individual suffering. Against this backdrop, the article argues that Honneth’s theory of social freedom needs to account for at least mild forms of social suffering. To achieve this, the article explores a line of argumentation that Honneth's recent approach has left underdeveloped. It will be argued that individuals must be able to interpret their needs and interests without constraints to determine if they can be met through social cooperation. The article develops two possibilities, hinted at in Honneth's theory, to illuminate such practices of self-interpretation: Parsons’ theory of value internalization and Honneth's earlier theory of recognition. Both argue that the ability to interpret one’s needs and interests rests on a psychological foundation laid during early primary socialization. Social misdevelopments and pathologies that distort the understanding and articulation of those needs thus must lead to frustration and, consequently, social suffering. However, since both internalization and recognition theory have clear deficits in the context of a theory of social freedom, the article concludes by calling for further conceptual work on social freedom and suffering.