In Vitro Fertilization: Autonomy and Policy
Dissertation, University of Georgia (
1996)
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Abstract
The development of in vitro fertilization has ignited fresh controversy regarding the concept of autonomy. Some authors claim that the technique offers opportunity for initiative, action and autonomy traditionally denied women. Other authors condemn the technologies, claiming that support of them only perpetuates the essentialist definition of woman as reproducer, thus, in practice, reduces the autonomy of women. This dissertation is an attempt to make sense of the fact that two groups, who share the same basic political perspective, and examine the same practices, arrive at completely different conclusions about the effect of those practices on the level of autonomy possessed and exercised by women. ;I present an examination of the development and use of in vitro fertilization, discussing their historical development, the qualifications one currently must satisfy in order to avail oneself of them, and some potential technological developments in this area. Along the way, I explain the centrality of the concept of autonomy and reveal the presuppositions with which I work. ;In chapters II and III, I offer standardized versions of some of the existing arguments concerning in vitro fertilization. The arguments depend upon stipulative definitions of autonomy, one derived from the account of John Stuart Mill, the other from the work of Immanuel Kant. I show that both arguments rely upon problematic assumptions about the nature of autonomy and the relationship between individual desires and societal structures. ;I propose, in chapter IV, a view of autonomy that I derive from the work of Michel Foucault, Jana Sawicki, and Jean Grimshaw. I claim that this conceptualization is theoretically equal and, in this inquiry, practically superior to the previous accounts. ;In the final chapter, I employ the alternative account of autonomy to re-examine the standardized arguments. I show that the single superior concept of autonomy can be employed in order to reveal significant insights in both arguments. I also show that a distinction can be made between the estimation of actual present autonomy and potential future autonomy for women in relation to developments in the in vitro fertilization technique