What is this thing called 'commonsense psychology'?

Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):3-19 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

What is this thing called ‘Commonsense Psychology’? The first matter to settle is what the issue is here. By ‘commonsense psychology,’ I mean primarily the systems of describing, explaining and predicting human thought and action in terms of beliefs, desires, hopes, fears, expectations, intentions and other so-called propositional attitudes. Although commonsense psychology encompasses more than propositional attitudes--e.g., emotions, traits and abilities are also within its purview--belief-desire reasoning forms the core of commonsense psychology. Commonsense psychology is what we use to explain intentional action as ordinarily described--e.g., Jack went to the store because he wanted some ice cream. Commonsense psychology also is used to explain mental states--e.g., Jill feared that she would be late because she thought that the meeting began at 4:00. Commonsense psychology is the province of everyone; we all use it all the time

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,090

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Commonsense Psychology.Shaun Nichols - 1992 - Dissertation, Rutgers the State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick
The computational account of belief.Lawrence J. Kaye - 1994 - Erkenntnis 40 (2):137-53.
Reply to Jackson, II.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (2):196-198.
III—The Epistemic Role of Intentions.Johannes Roessler - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1pt1):41-56.
Intentionality and moral judgments in commonsense thought about action.Steven Sverdlik - 2004 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):224-236.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
212 (#122,999)

6 months
14 (#180,659)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Citations of this work

The limits of spectatorial folk psychology.Daniel D. Hutto - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):548-73.
"Folk psychology" is not folk psychology.Matthew Ratcliffe - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):31-52.
Mental causation and the paradoxes of explanation.Karsten R. Stueber - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (3):243-77.
Psychological explanation and implicit theory.Frank Jackson - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):83-95.
Davidson, Reasons, and Causes: A Plea for a Little Bit More Empathy.Karsten R. Stueber - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (2):59-75.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind.Paul M. Churchland (ed.) - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.

View all 17 references / Add more references