In defense of the use of commonsense psychology in the criminal law

Law and Philosophy 25 (6):571 - 612 (2006)
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Abstract

The criminal law depends upon 'commonsense' or 'folk' psychology, a seemingly innate theory used by all normal human beings as a means to understand and predict other humans' behavior. This paper discusses two major types of arguments that commonsense psychology is not a true theory of human behavior, and thus should be eliminated and replaced. The paper argues that eliminitivist projects fail to provide evidence that commonsense psychology is a false theory, and argues that there is no need to seek a replacement theory of behavior for use in the criminal law.

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Katrina L. Sifferd
Elmhurst University

References found in this work

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Sensations and Brain Processes.J. J. C. Smart - 2003 - In John Heil, Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David Lewis - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas, Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.

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