Attitudes as nonentities

Philosophical Studies 76 (2-3):175-203 (1994)
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Abstract

materialist that beliefs are not immaterial soul-states, I think that the conception of beliefs as brain states is badly misguided. I hope to show that "beliefs are brain states or soul states" is a false dichotomy. I am using the phrase 'beliefs as brain states' to cover several familiar theses: the token-identity thesis, according to which beliefs are identical to brain-state tokens; nonreductive materialism, according to which beliefs are constituted by brain states (as pebbles are constituted by..

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10.1007/bf00989824

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Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Citations of this work

What is this thing called 'commonsense psychology'?Lynne Rudder Baker - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):3-19.
First-personal aspects of agency.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):1-16.
Bennett and Hacker on neural materialism.Greg Janzen - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (3):273-286.

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