Abstract

Since the Modern era it has been assumed that in providing a scientifically respectable description of reality one need mention only mathematizable properties. 'Aesthetically interesting' properties, on the other hand, may be ignored in such serious ontological discussions. Reacting against this trend, I first present general considerations which motivate the need for content, e.g. color, in an acceptable ontology. Working within a Sellarsian-inspired framework I explore traditional and contemporary treatments of color. Rejecting dualisms and reductionist strategies I develop and expand Sellars' suggestion that an adequate scientific account of reality must ultimately countenance such contents as color. ;However, what might be called the substance-bias, that trend in metaphysics which has downplayed other categories to the glory of substance, is an inadequate ontological schema in which to introduce color as something more than disposition or appearance. Instead, we must endorse an ontology of absolute processes. Exploring the basic features of such an ontology elucidates how it can, while substance ontologies cannot, accommodate the content of sensory experience. ;Finally, such an ontology provides an acceptable account of the qualitative features of reality while remaining true to the spirit of Nominalism. I suggest that with an ontology of absolute processes one can explain how two particulars have the same quality without recourse to universals, while at the same time avoiding the pitfalls of trope ontologies and class nominalism