Abstract

Beginning with an analysis of the "reluctant gambler problem"—in which the notion of guiding one's life by probability seems to conflict with the preferences of rational people—we draw a distinction between rule and act probabilism. Arguing that humans are rule probabilists by default, we show that reluctant gamblers can be viewed as rule probabilists. If so viewed, their reluctance to gamble is consistent with their rational use of probability judgments to guide their lives.The distinction between rule and act probabilism suggests a way to analyze the risks stemming from the September 11 terrorist attacks. Assessing the risks posed by the new reality of terrorism in the U.S. in light of the rule versus act probabilist distinction shows the risks Americans face from a terrorist attack are essentially the same as they were before September 11, 2002. Yet empirical investigation indicates Americans exaggerate their personal risks from terrorism.The perception that the risks of terrorism mushroomed on September 11 is partially explained by the 24-hour news stations' TV coverage and the current administration's "interest" in diverting attention from their own questionable practices. While the risks of terrorism are not appreciably higher than they were prior to September 11, they might be further reduced. Unfortunately, our government's strategy to reduce the risks of terrorist strikes involves weakening the Constitution. Americans face the question how much it is appropriate to pay—in diminished rights and liberties—to reduce a risk that is essentially the same as it was prior to the attacks