Abstract

The tendency for judges to respond positively to negligence claims advanced by those who have rendered assistance to accident victims has recently come into collision with the judicial impulse to limit the range of circumstances in which recovery can be made for psychiatric injury. The upshot of this collision is identified as a reduction in the range of circumstances in which those rendering assistance to accident victims can recover for psychiatric harm. This development is criticized on the ground that it has compromised pursuit of what is identified as one of the law's subsidiary purposes: namely, the promotion (in a narrow range of circumstances) of strongly altruistic activity. The ground for making this criticism is found in a body of doctrine that supports the claim that the law is informed by a commitment to the altruism principle. This principle is contrasted with the narrower rescue principle and is identified as supporting not only the claims of rescuers but also those of persons who render assistance in the aftermath of particularly harrowing accidents. While the House of Lords» decision is identified as exhibiting insensitivity to the altruism principle, it is none the less concluded that the position staked out by their Lordships is defensible. Support for this conclusion is found in the ideal of distributive justice, which provided one of the grounds for the House's decision in White. Further, the relationship between the ideal of corrective justice and the ideal of distributive justice is identified as a source of significant tension in the law of negligence