Abstract

A few years ago, Peter Benson argued that unless claims in corrective justice are grounded on an independent, non‐distributive measure of entitlement, corrective justice collapses into distributive justice. More recently, Stephen Perry argued that the autonomy of corrective justice can be secured with something more modest, namely a free‐standing conception of harm. I argue, first, that Perry's account is closer to Benson's than we might at first think, and, second, that implicit in each is a view that we ought to reject, namely that corrective justice can be autonomous only if there are rights or entitlements which the law does not confer but must, on pain of injustice, protect. In conclusion I defend the view that corrective justice takes as found the positive law's measure of those interests that merit protection in individuals' interactions with others, and explain what, on this account, is meant by holding that corrective justice is autonomous