On the status of “things in themselves” in Kant

Synthese 47 (2):289 - 299 (1981)
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Abstract

For Kant, the concept of things in themselves or noumena is not a door through which we are able to exit from the phenomenal realm into the sphere of mind-independent reality. Rather, it is an epistemic, mind-imposed contrivance through which alone we are able to operate our conceptual scheme — a scheme in which objectivity and externality play a crucial role.

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reprint Rescher, Nicholas (1981) "On the Status of "Things-in-themselves" in Kant". Revue Internationale de Philosophie 35(136/137):346

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Nicholas Rescher
University of Pittsburgh

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