Abstract

The gender spectrum, a continuum ranging from “male” to “female,” is a huge improvement over the traditional binary model, according to which one can be either one or the other, and no degrees are allowed. However, the model still suffers from some inadequacies, most notably the inability to represent other genders and agender identities. This is accounted for in the new “spectral” models of gender, which use independent scales to measure the degree to which a person identifies with a given gender category. However, by conceiving the amounts on gender dimensions to be mutually independent, these models invite other difficulties, most notably the inability to account for agender identities in a straightforward fashion. In this paper, I argue that a way to solve the problems with the new models (and not to have the old problems re-appear) is to take a step back, of sorts, towards the initial gender spectrum. I explore from a perspective of philosophical logic the types of relations among gender categories in the spectral models of gender and argue that the initial spectrum construes gender categories to be in the logical opposition of “fuzzy contradiction,” while the models with more than one spectrum do not construe gender categories to be in any kind of logical opposition. I propose a weaker opposition (namely, “fuzzy contrariety”) between gender categories, as well as the “fuzzy gender hexagon”—an application of a particular abstract logical diagram to gender terms—as a model of gender identity.