Gender identity: the subjective fit account

Philosophical Studies 181 (10):2701-2736 (2024)
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Abstract

This paper proposes a new account of gender identity on which for A to have gender G as part of their gender identity is for A to not take G not to fit them (or to positively take G to fit them). It argues that this subjective fit account of gender identity fits well with trans people’s testimony and both trans and cis people’s experiences of their genders. The subjective fit account also avoids the problems that existing accounts of gender identity face. Existing accounts face broadly two types of problems. First, they seem to imply that trans people have gender identities different from those that they in fact have. For instance, they seem to imply that some trans women do not have a female gender identity or have not always had that gender identity, contrary to their testimony and experiences. I argue that the subjective fit account avoids this problem. Second, many existing accounts of gender identity seem to conflict with the idea that our gender identities merit respect. I argue that the subjective fit account avoids this problem because it understands gender identities to consist in normative experiences and judgments and normative experiences and judgments merit respect.

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Rach Cosker-Rowland
University of Leeds

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References found in this work

Justice as fairness: a restatement.John Rawls (ed.) - 2001 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Justice for hedgehogs.Ronald Dworkin - 2011 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Gender and Gender Terms.Elizabeth Barnes - 2019 - Noûs 54 (3):704-730.
Liberalism’s Religion.Cécile Laborde (ed.) - 2017 - Harvard University Press.

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