Explicable explainers: The problem of mental dispositions in Spinoza’s Ethics

In . pp. 79-98 (2009)
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10.1515/9783110211825.79

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reprint Renz, Ursula (2009) "Explicable Explainers: the Problem of Mental Dispositions in Spinoza's Ethics". In Damschen, Gregor, Schnepf, Robert, Stüber, Karsten, Debating Dispositions: Issues in Metaphysics, Epistemology and Philosophy of Mind, pp. 79-98: de Gruyter (2009)

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Ursula Renz
University of Graz

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What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 1 (4):328-332.

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