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What Facts Should be Treated as ‘Fixed’ in Public Justification?
Social Epistemology 33 (6):491-502 (2019)
Abstract
ABSTRACTIn his account of public reason Rawls assumes that some facts ought to be treated as ‘fixed’, or beyond reasonable disagreement. These include, for him, facts upon which there is a scientif...Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Public justification and expert disagreement over non-pharmaceutical interventions for the COVID-19 pandemic.Marcus Dahlquist & Henrik D. Kugelberg - 2021 - Journal of Medical Ethics 49 (1):9–13.
Science as Public Reason and the Controversiality Objection.Klemens Kappel - 2021 - Res Publica 27 (4):619-639.
The Dark Knowledge Problem: Why Public Justifications are Not Arguments.Sean Donahue - 2023 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 21 (3-4):298-332.
Public Reason Liberalism and the Certification of Scientific Claims.Jason Tyndal - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 11 (8):8-14.
Citizens in Search of Facts: A Case Study from the Oregon Citizens’ Initiative Review on Measure 82.Ekaterina Lukianova & Igor Tolochin - 2022 - Social Epistemology 36 (2):180-193.
References found in this work
Experts: Which ones should you trust?Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.
Democracy, Public Policy, and Lay Assessments of Scientific Testimony.Elizabeth Anderson - 2011 - Episteme 8 (2):144-164.
When is consensus knowledge based? Distinguishing shared knowledge from mere agreement.Boaz Miller - 2013 - Synthese 190 (7):1293-1316.
Precis – The Order of Public Reason: A Theory of Freedom and Morality in a Diverse and Bounded World.Gerald Gaus - 2013 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (1):8-13.
The roles of religious conviction in a publicly justified polity: The implications of convergence, asymmetry and political institutions.Gerald F. Gaus & Kevin Vallier - 2009 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 35 (1-2):51-76.
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