Wittgenstein and ancient skepticism: disagreements, suspension of judgment and persuasion

Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 60 (2019)
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Abstract

Recent discussions about the ancient sources of skepticism have provided new elements to evaluate the scope of the Pyrrhonian proposal and to differentiate it from modern skeptical manifestations. This, in turn, has allowed us to explore the affinities between the ideas that Sextus Empiricus exposed in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism and the ideas that Wittgenstein presented in On Certainty. My purpose is to evaluate the scope of these affnities from the place that both authors give to the problem of disagreement.

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References found in this work

The logic of deep disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 1985 - Informal Logic 7 (1):3-11.
The Logic of Deep Disagreements.Robert Fogelin - 2005 - Informal Logic 25 (1):3-11.
Précis of Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification.Robert J. Fogelin - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2):395-400.
Disagreement and skepticism.Diego E. Machuca (ed.) - 2012 - New York: Routledge.

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