Underdetermination, Multiplicity, and Mathematical Logic

Philosophy Study 3 (2) (2013)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Whether a collection of scientific data can be explained only by a unique theory or whether such data can be equally explained by multiple theories is one of the more contested issues in the history and philosophy of science. This paper argues that the case for multiple explanations is strengthened by the widespread failure of models in mathematical logic to be unique, i.e., categorical. Science is taken to require replicable and explicit public knowledge; this necessitates an unambiguous language for its transmission. Mathematics has been chosen as the vehicle to transmit scientific knowledge, both because of its “unreasonable effectiveness” and because of its unambiguous nature, hence the vogue of axiomatic systems. But mathematical logic tells us that axiomatic systems need not refer to uniquely defined real structures. Hence what is accepted as science may be only one of several possibilities.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,290

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Development of Logic in the Twentieth Century.Chang Shangshui - 1987 - Chinese Studies in Philosophy 18 (3):3.
What could mathematics be for it to function in distinctively mathematical scientific explanations?Marc Lange - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 87 (C):44-53.
Set Theory and Logic.Robert Roth Stoll - 2012 - San Francisco and London: Courier Corporation.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-09-23

Downloads
31 (#718,157)

6 months
11 (#322,218)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The scientific image.C. Van Fraassen Bas - 1980 - New York: Oxford University Press.
What numbers could not be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
The unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences.Eugene Wigner - 1960 - Communications in Pure and Applied Mathematics 13:1-14.

View all 7 references / Add more references