The reality of lies

Filozofija I Društvo 24 (2):105-131 (2013)
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Abstract

A lie is neither a false proposition, nor a mistake, nor a mere fiction; it is a type of fiction, an act, and precisely an intentional act. An act calls for a subject, and therefore a lie is inseparable from its subject. Together, they make up a real object: it has to be real, since a lie produces effects, and the cause-effect relationship only holds between real beings. Like every real object, a lie unfolds in a context. But there is more: it identifies a context. Laz nije ni pogresna tvrdnja, ni greska, niti pak puka fikcija; ona predstavlja odredjeni tip fikcije, cin - tacnije - intencionalni cin. Cinu je potreban subjekat, te je stoga laz neodvojiva od svog subjekta. Oni zajedno cine stvaran objekat: on mora biti stvaran,buduci da laz proizvodi posledice, a odnos uzroka i posledice vazi jedino izmedju stvarnih bica. Kao i svaki objekat, laz se obelodanjuje u kontekstu. Ali to nije sve, ona identifikuje kontekst.

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Venanzio Raspa
Università degli Studi di Urbino

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References found in this work

Faust. Goethe - 2006 - In Thomas L. Cooksey (ed.), Masterpieces of philosophical literature. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.
Individui e continui.Venanzio Raspa - 2008 - Rivista di Estetica 39:189-214.

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