Searle's experiments with thought

Philosophy of Science 53 (June):271-9 (1986)
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Abstract

A critique of several recent objections to John Searle's Chinese-Room Argument against the possibility of "strong AI" is presented. The objections are found to miss the point, and a stronger argument against Searle is presented, based on a distinction between "syntactic" and "semantic" understanding.

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10.1086/289312

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William J. Rapaport
State University of New York, Buffalo

Citations of this work

Semiotic Systems, Computers, and the Mind: How Cognition Could Be Computing.William J. Rapaport - 2012 - International Journal of Signs and Semiotic Systems 2 (1):32-71.
The philosophy of computer science.Raymond Turner - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Minds, brains, and programs.John Searle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):417-57.
Minds, Brains, and Programs.John Searle - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
The ‘causal power’ of machines.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (3):442-444.
The Monadology.Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz - 2007 - In Aloysius Martinich, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Early Modern Philosophy: Essential Readings with Commentary. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

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