Abstract

An alternative theory of public interest is then presented, which does not interpret 'public interest' as logically parallel to 'individual interest,' but rather interprets the concept as an interest whose object is the realization of the 'public.' The realization of the 'public' is then identified as the realization of the conditions of rational discourse. The set of these conditions is specified. This alternative theory of public interest is shown to meet the normative metatheoretical criteria. Finally, the basis of a social theory is proposed, which would depict the ways in which the conditions of rational discouse do come to be realized in society. ;First, a normative metatheory is developed which outlines the nature of normative theories and specifies a criteria for judging them. Then, 'interest' is examined, and an acceptable interpretation of this concept is laid out. Next, traditional theories of public interest are identified as those theories which interpret 'public interest' as logically parallel to 'individual interest,' i.e., the ascription of some interest to some entity: In the case of 'public interest,' that entity is some aggregate of individuals. An exhaustive four-part typology of such traditional aggregationist theories of public interest is constructed. Each of these four types of aggregationist theories is then examined and found to be flawed in light of certain normative metatheoretical considerations. ;The normative concept of 'public interest' is frequently used in social theorizing and the discussion of public policy issues. The concept's meaning is vague, however, and so its use often obstructs rather than furthers an understanding of such matters. This dissertation is an effort to determine what an acceptable meaning of the concept of 'public interest' would be