Strong Epistemic Possibility and Evidentiality

Topoi 36 (1):183-195 (2017)
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Abstract

The paper distinguishes between weak and strong epistemic possibility and argues that the notion of strong epistemic possibility is the key to solving some of the most vexing puzzles about the semantics of epistemic modality.

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Citations of this work

Objects and Attitudes.Friederike Moltmann - 2024 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic and Objective Possibility in Science.Ylwa Sjölin Wirling & Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2024 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 75 (4):821-841.
An object‐based truthmaker semantics for modals.Friederike Moltmann - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):255-288.
What to believe about your belief that you're in the good case.Alex Worsnip - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6:206-233.

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References found in this work

Nonfactualism about epistemic modality.Seth Yalcin - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Epistemic possibilities.Keith DeRose - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.
Epistemic modals are assessment-sensitive.John MacFarlane - 2011 - In Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson (eds.), Epistemic Modality. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Embedding Epistemic Modals.Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):867-914.

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