Prophecy without middle knowledge

Faith and Philosophy 24 (4):433-457 (2007)
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Abstract

While it might seem prima facie plausible that divine foreknowledge is all that is needed for prophecy, this seems incorrect. To issue a prophecy, God hasto know not just how someone will act, but how someone would act were the prophecy issued. This makes some think that Middle Knowledge is required.I argue that Thomas Flint’s two Middle Knowledge based accounts of prophecy are unsatisfactory, but one of them can be repaired. However the resources needed for repair also yield a sketch of a foreknowledge-only account of prophecy.

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Alexander R. Pruss
Baylor University

Citations of this work

Recent Work on Molinism.Ken Perszyk - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (8):755-770.
Foreknowledge and Free Will.Linda Zagzebski - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:online.
The Freedom of Christ and Explanatory Priority.Timothy Pawl - 2014 - Religious Studies 50 (2):157-173.
Molinism, Creature-types, and the Nature of Counterfactual Implication.Daniel Murphy - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (1):65-86.
Best feasible worlds: divine freedom and Leibniz’s Lapse.Justin Mooney - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 77 (3):219-229.

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References found in this work

Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1977 - American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (2):109-117.
An anti-molinist argument.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1991 - Philosophical Perspectives 5:343-353.

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