Turing and Free Will: A New Take on an Old Debate

In Alisa Bokulich & Juliet Floyd, Philosophical Explorations of the Legacy of Alan Turing. Springer Verlag. pp. 305-321 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In 1948 Turing claimed that the concept of intelligence is an “emotional concept”. An emotional concept is a response-dependent concept and Turing’s remarks in his 1948 and 1952 papers suggest a response-dependence approach to the concept of intelligence. On this view, whether or not an object is intelligent is determined, as Turing said, “as much by our own state of mind and training as by the properties of the object”. His discussion of free will suggests a similar approach. Turing said, for example, that if a machine’s program “results in its doing something interesting which we had not anticipated I should be inclined to say that the machine had originated something”. This points to a new form of free will compatibilism, which I call response-dependence compatibilism and explore here.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,486

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Intelligence Naturalized, Turing-style.Diane Proudfoot - 2024 - In Ali Hossein Khani, Gary Kemp, Hassan Amiriara & Hossein Sheykh Rezaee, Naturalism and its challenges. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 274—294.
Turing’s Three Senses of “Emotional”.Diane Proudfoot - 2014 - International Journal of Synthetic Emotions 5 (2):7-20.
Alan Turing’s Concept of Mind.Rajakishore Nath - 2020 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 37 (1):31-50.
Turing’s Mystery Machine.Diane Proudfoot & Jack Copeland - 2019 - American Philosophical Association Newsletter for Philosophy and Computers 18 (2):1-6.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-02-07

Downloads
4 (#1,827,445)

6 months
3 (#1,096,948)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Diane Proudfoot
University of Canterbury

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references