Can the Capability Approach Be Justified?

Philosophical Topics 30 (2):167-228 (2002)
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02762080

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10.5840/philtopics200230216

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Thomas W. Pogge
Yale University

Citations of this work

Sufficiency: Restated and defended.Robert Huseby - 2009 - Journal of Political Philosophy 18 (2):178-197.
The capability approach in practice.Ingrid Robeyns - 2006 - Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (3):351–376.
Disability and Justice.David Wasserman - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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