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Can Robots think : reply to Tooley's second statement
In Alvin Plantinga & Michael Tooley (eds.), Knowledge of God. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 218–232 (2008)
Abstract
This chapter contains sections titled: Can a Material Thing Think? Tooley's Reply to the Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism.Author's Profile
Can Robots think? Tooley pointing out ‐ sentential belief contexts are intensional Tooley's arguement ‐ belief just is a certain sequence of experiences Tooley's reply to evolutionary argument against naturalism Tooley's project ‐ refuting the Evolutionary Argument against Naturalism (EAAN) three arguments against naturalism naturalism cannot accommodate ‐ the notion of proper function if naturalism were true ‐ no distinction between health and sickness no material object can hold beliefs – that if naturalism were true, no one would ever believe anything
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