Abstract

This paper provides an interpretation of two paragraphs from Heidegger’s 1925-26 lectures on the question of “truth”. First, I will consider Heidegger's criticism of Lotze’s notion of “ideality”; then, I will focus on Heidegger's claim that Husserl was “fascinated” by such a Lotzean notion. In the first section I will describe Heidegger's ontological approach to the distinction between reality and ideality. In the second section I will explain why, in Heidegger's view, Lotze’s understanding of the notions of “reality” and “ideality”, construed as different forms of Wirklichkeit, depends on some uncritical presumptions. In the third section, I will evaluate the consequences of Lotze's perspective on the notions of ideality and truth, so as to turn my attention to Husserl’s Prolegomenaand his allegedly adoption of Lotze’s notion of “ideality” as universality. Accordingly, I will suggest that Heidegger’s criticism is limited not only to Husserl's Prolegomena but to his phenomenology as a whole. Finally, I will discuss the problem of universality from the point of view of Heidegger’s existential analytic. By referring to a 1925 lecture, I will suggest that Heidegger’s rejection of Husserl’s “reduction” is to be read in light of his criticism of the notion of “ideality”.