Abstract

Some commentators of Heidegger's analysis of technology emphasize the critical component of his reflections. Other philosophers highlight the call for a new non-technical type of thinking. Some readers simply proclaim the »neutrality« of Heidegger's description. A problem with the first type of interpretation is that it often re-inscribes a form of »calculative« thinking that Heidegger is clearly criticising. The difficulty of the second view is that it sometimes goes in the direction of an »irrationalism« of which Heidegger is often accused but of which I believe he is not guilty. The third standpoint might be called a form of »fenomenological correctness« – clinging to the neutrality of the phenomenological project so as to offend nobody. Ultimately, accepting such a »distant« standpoint not only strips Heidegger's philosophy of some of its vigour, but is also rather »un-Heideggerian« in that his philosophy undermines the very notion of the philosopher as a calm, detached, neutral spectator. The aim of this paper is to chart a different course of interpretation through Husserl's earliest work; a course which doesn't take all of the bite out of Heidegger's critique of technology. Following a summary of the salient features of Heidegger's view of technology, I indicate in the second part of this paper the Husserlian foundation of much of that view. In the concluding part, I attempt to develop the sense of rational responsibility for technology which arises out of the juxtaposition of Husserl and Heidegger