The Bayesian Era in the philosophy of science

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 80:123-127 (2020)
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Abstract

In this review essay of Jan Sprenger and Stephan Hartman's new book Bayesian Philosophy of Science (2019), I discuss the objectivity of Bayesianism, its implications for the scientific realism debates, and the extent to which they have succeeded in formalising Karl Popper's concept of corroboration.

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10.1016/j.shpsa.2020.01.006

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William Peden
Johannes Kepler University of Linz

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References found in this work

Probability Disassembled.John D. Norton - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):141-171.
Exhuming the No-Miracles Argument.Colin Howson - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):205-211.
Two Impossibility Results for Measures of Corroboration.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):139--159.
Popper’s Measure of Corroboration and P.Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2013 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4):axs029.

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