Lnductive probability and scientific rationality

Theoria 4 (1):217-225 (1988)
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Abstract

This paper tries to simplify the situation in modern epistemology, where the scientific method seems to be accomplished by different scientific methodologies. this is partially done by asserting that the popperian critical methodology can be seen as a special case of bayesianism. to this effect, it is firstly argued, that popper's corroboration degree measures the probabilistic support that evidence lends to universal hypotheses. then it is affirmed, that popper and miller have not established the impossibility of inductive probability. and it is finally claimed, that bayesian probabilistic support encompasses popper's corroboration concept

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