Confirmation of Standards of Proof through Bayes Theorem

Archiv Fuer Rechts Und Sozialphilosophie 106 (4):532-553 (2020)
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Abstract

Legal reasoning on the requirements and application of law has been studied for centuries, but in this subject area the legal profession maintains predominantly the same stance it did in the time of the Ancient Greeks. There is a gap between the standards of proof, one which has been always demonstrated by percentages and in terms of the evaluation of these standards by percentages by mathematical or statistical methods. One method to fill the gap is Bayes theorem that describes an event’s probability based on conditions that might be related to an event. Bayes theorem can help to establish or confirm a relation between facts and rules if there is sufficient other evidence that connect a party in a procedure with a considered legal action.

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