Sensory awareness is not a wide physical relation: An empirical argument against externalist intentionalism

Noûs 40 (2):205-240 (2006)
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Abstract

Phenomenal intentionality is a singular form of intentionality. Science shows it is internally-determined. So standard externalist models for reducing intentionality don't apply to it.

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10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00607.x

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Adam Pautz
Brown University

Citations of this work

Qualia ain't in the head.Alex Byrne & Michael Tye - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):241-255.
Senses for senses.Brad Thompson - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):99 – 117.
Qualia.Michael Tye - 1997 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Perception and the fall from Eden.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 49--125.

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