Abstract

In this paper we propose a modern theory of linguistic iconicity, comparing it with similar, though more primitive ideas expounded in Plato's Cratylus. In the Cratylus two views on natural language compete: Hermogenes favours absolute arbitrariness of names, Cratylus defends the (etymological) naturalness — iconicity — of names. In the end, both these extreme views are rejected, the main conclusion being that one should not base philosophy on the study of words. The ancient controversy shows up again as a clash between Saussurean (arbitrariness ) and Peircean (iconicity) thinking, though extreme views are avoided. Onomatopoeia and Plato's articulatory mimicry are instances of imagic (concrete) iconicity, now recognized by everybody. Less known but more interesting for grammar is diagrammatic (schematic, abstract) iconicity. A diagram is „a systematic arrangement of signs, none of which necessarily resembles its referent, but whose relationships to each other mirror the relationships of their referents” (Haiman 1980: 515). A well-known example is word-order reflecting temporal sequence (as in Veni, vidi, vici). The most interesting area of diagrammatic iconicity is to be found in the opposition between marked (= complex) and unmarked structures in natural language. For example, the plural is marked as opposed to the singular. The iconicity lies in the fact that the unmarked form of the singular (e.g. book) corresponds to an unmarked (simple) meaning, while the marked form of the plural (e.g. book-s) matches a marked meaning, i.e. the more form, the more meaning. Unmarked meaning is then viewed not in objectivist but in experiential terms: ‘unmarked’ is related to ‘prototypical‘. Prototypical linguistic structures are seen to go back to biological, psychological and cultural properties of the prototypical speaker (e.g. definite human agent). A number of examples of this kind of iconicity are discussed. On the biological level, so-called freezes exist, whereby unmarked sounds precede marked counterparts (e.g. flip-flop; tnck or neat). On the biologicalpsychological level, this is paralleled by lexical coordinations (man and woman ; yes orno). In morphological categories, one finds pairs like singular-plural, definite-indefinite, animate-inanimate, masculine-feminine, present-past, positive-negative, locativetemporal. As to semantic-syntactic structures, direct perception (I hear him singing) and direct causation are unmarked in relation to the indirect counterparts. On the cultural level, politeness structures are adduced. We conclude that both Plato and Wittgenstein II rejected iconicity too radically : languages are more motivated, less arbitrary, than is commonly thought. Our view qualifies the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis as well. Other consequences concern feminism, Montaguegrammar, the place of intensions in a reference-theory of names (Kripke/Putnam) and philosophy as a ‘critique of language’