The Subject of First Philosophy According to Aristotle and Ibn Sina

Avicennian Philosophy Journal 12 (40):29-51 (2008)
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Abstract

In this article a comparison is made between Aristotle's general outlook-of course, according to one of the valid interpretation of his thought-and general outlook of Ibn Sina with regard to supreme science of first philosophy and its central theme, which according to some of the well-known and definite Aristotelian teachings the true and central subject of this science, in his view, is eternal and separable beings and in the end First Mover. On this basis discussion about other beings in the first philosophy is a secondary discussion and because of it would bean attribution which in being called as "existent" owe to it. It is evident that this attitude is contrary to the common tradition of Islamic philosophers in their encounter with the first philosophy and its subject matter because these phibsophers, as well as scholastic Philosophers influenced by Ibn Sina regard the subject of this science with a wider circle, and consider the proof of the Necessary Being among the subject, of this science. Therefore a distinction is made between two sections of this science, ie theology in general sense and theology in specific sense, a distinction which is not found in Aristotle's philosophy, but for him the first philosophy is considered an all - out theology.

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