Abstract
The article aims to show the different declinations of the double conceptual movement—from reason to organism and from organism to reason—that can be found in Kant and Hegel, and the implications of such differences for their respective philosophical systems and for their conception of reason. Whereas in Kant the movement from reason to organism and from organism to reason turns out to be “interrupted”, so that the it is never completely fulfilled, Hegel, presenting the organism as “reason in sensible form”, opens up the possibility of a complete intelligibility of the former while at the same time guaranteeing the conceptual space for a complete self-understanding of reason in the sense of a living being. However, if the living organism is a real instantiation of reason, such instantiation is presented as not sufficient, since the animal is an incomplete realization of reason. In this sense, the relation reason-organism seems to take the shape of a hierarchical movement in which the latter is subordinated to the former. And yet, Hegel speaks of the self-realizing movement of reason as the movement in which it shows its organic and living character.