Abstract

Tooley (2012) has attacked presentism by urging that dated tenseless sentences can be both meaningful and true, but they imply consequences that presentism cannot accept. Tooley is right is acknowledging tenseless language, because without it the competing theses in temporal ontology, including presentism, cannot be appropriately formulated and the ontological dispute risks to be unsubstantial. Thus, presentism should indeed acknowledge dated tenseless sentences. However, when properly interpreted, such sentences do not have the anti-presentist consequences claimed by Tooley. The problem is that Tooley puts forward, rather than a proper interpretation, truth conditions that an eternalist could associate to them, in the light of eternalistically acceptable truthmakers. A presentist, however, would provide different truthmakers. We need a formal language that allows us to rigorously distinguish between proper interpretations of sentences and their truth conditions driven by different ontological views. One such language is sketched here in broad outline.