Dissecting the Suicide Machine Argument: Insights from the Hales – Licon Debate

Logos and Episteme 4 (3):339-352 (2013)
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Abstract

I assess the debate over the Suicide Machine Argument. There are several lessons to be learned from this debate. First, there is a fruitful distinction to be made,between tensed and tenseless versions of presentism, despite the temptation to suppose that presentism is a tensed theory of time. Second, once we’ve made the distinction between different kinds of presentism, it is clear that Licon’s objection protects the tenseless version of presentism from the Suicide Machine Argument; however, the argument is still effective against the tensed version. Finally, I argue that if the presentist wants to remain a card carrying presentist, in the face of the challenge posed by Hales, then she must abandon her commitment to tense.

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Presentists Should Not Believe in Time Travel.Takeshi Sakon - 2021 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 53 (2):191-213.

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