Free Will In Lucretius’ And Lem’s Materialism
Abstract
In this paper the author argues that the philosophy of Stanisław Lem is a form of neo-Lucretianism, and he considers Lem as the Lucretius of the 20th century. The article demonstrates some parallel strains in their views on free will. The problem of free will presents insurmountable difficulties within all philosophical perspectives. The approaches which accept free will are considered indeterminist; examples of this approach are the conceptions of Epicurus, St. Augustine, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, Berdyaev or Jaspers. Stanisław Lem, who thought of himself as a materialist, wished to be considered as an indeterminist as well. According to him, the source of human free will is the social nature of human; he believed that the human cannot exist without a community. Our metaphysical and moral freedom consists in choosing a system of preferences, i.e. a set of autonomous values, from among the different systems persisting in a society. The author argues that at this point Lem’s naturalism reaches its limits. Key words LEM, LUCRETIUS, FREE WILL.