Why people believe in indeterminist free will

Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2033-2054 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Recent empirical evidence indicates that people tend to believe that they possess indeterminist free will, and people’s experience of choosing and deciding is that they possess such freedom. Some also maintain that people’s belief in indeterminist free will has its source in their experience of choosing and deciding. Yet there seem to be good reasons to resist endorsing. Despite this, I maintain that belief in indeterminist free will really does have its source in experience. I explain how this is so by appeal to the phenomenon of prospection, which is the mental simulation of future possibilities for the purpose of guiding action. Crucially, prospection can be experienced. And because of the way in which prospection models choice, it is easy for agents to experience and to believe that their choice is indeterministic. Yet this belief is not justified; the experience of prospection, and hence of free will as being indeterminist, is actually consistent with determinism.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,667

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Facing the future: agents and choices in our indeterminist world.Nuel D. Belnap - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Michael Perloff & Ming Xu.
Causation and Free Will in Early Buddhist Philosophy.Paul Bernier - 2020 - Buddhist Studies Review 36 (2):191-220.
The Indeterminist Intuition.Shaun Nichols - 2012 - The Monist 95 (2):290-307.
Is free will incompatible with determinism?Marvin Zimmerman - 1966 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 26 (March):415-420.
Introduction.Robert Kane - 1996 - In The Significance of Free Will. New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
The Fall From Eden: Why Libertarianism Isn't Justified By Experience.Oisín Deery - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):319-334.
The Possibility of Choosing.Robert Trenor Fancher - 1980 - Dissertation, Vanderbilt University
Philosophy of action: 5 questions.Patricia Greenspan - 2009 - In Jesús H. Aguilar & Andrei A. Buckareff (eds.), Philosophy of Action: 5 Questions. Automatic Press/VIP.
How Do We Know That We Are Free?Timothy O’Connor - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):79-98.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-10-12

Downloads
128 (#171,904)

6 months
10 (#422,339)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Oisín Deery
York University

Citations of this work

Debunking arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12):e12638.
Free actions as a natural kind.Oisín Deery - 2021 - Synthese 198 (1):823-843.
Arguments for incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2003/2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Free Will as a Psychological Accomplishment.Eddy Nahmias - 2016 - In David Schmidtz & Carmen Pavel (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Freedom. New York: Oxford University Press.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - London, England: Dover Publications.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel Wegner - 2002 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

View all 66 references / Add more references