For Emergent Individualism

In Jonathan J. Loose, Angus John Louis Menuge & J. P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. Oxford, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 368–376 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Persons are those individuals who have or have a natural potential for the capacities of subjective awareness, intrinsic intentionality and cognition, and intentional action. This chapter considers persons primarily through their capacity for intentional action, and more specifically still through the freedom of will or choice that people commonly suppose mature, intact human persons to manifest. The main argument of the chapter is that the schematic philosophical “theory” of minded human persons that best accounts for relevant natural‐historical, organismic‐developmental, neurophysiological, and introspective evidence has it that people are wholly physically composed. The chapter shows how causally conditioned and physically composed entities may nonetheless be fundamental, nonderivative causes. A full articulation of emergence in terms of the nonbasic but fundamental requires people to take a stand on the ontological categories of individual (substance) and property. The chapter discusses substratum‐attribute theory, and applies the theory to the thesis that human persons are composite, emergent individuals.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,130

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Against Emergent Individualism.Robert C. Koons - 2018 - In Jonathan J. Loose, Angus John Louis Menuge & J. P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. Oxford, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 377–393.
The Emergence of Persons.William Hasker - 2012 - In J. B. Stump & Alan G. Padgett (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Science and Christianity. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 480-490.
Substance Dualism: A Defense.Charles Taliaferro - 2018 - In Jonathan J. Loose, Angus John Louis Menuge & J. P. Moreland (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism. Oxford, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 41–60.
Locke on Ideas, 'Substratum' and the Identity of Persons.Viorica Iby Farkas - 1982 - Dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles
Emergent individuals.Timothy O'Connor & Jonathan D. Jacobs - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):540-555.
Persistence, Persons, and Vagueness.Donald Porter Smith - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
God as an emergent property.Anthony Freeman - 2001 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (9-10):9-10.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-06-15

Downloads
25 (#876,630)

6 months
11 (#337,502)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Emergent Properties.Hong Yu Wong - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references