Abstract

"Is what is holy holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it because it is holy?" Socrates' question in the Euthyphro has long been the bane of divine command theorists, supporters of the thesis that God's will or commands are what make acts, attitudes, or outcomes right, wrong, good, evil, virtuous, or vicious. If God's will is the sole criterion of morality, there seems to be no reason why God might not mandate cruelty as easily as kindness. Those who would modify the divine will by imposing a limit of love, goodness, or rationality on God's commands adopt qualifications that appear to do the real theoretical work. Arbitrariness and irrelevance appear to be the divine command theorist's only options. ;I argue for a new perspective. Ethical theory has focused too narrowly on formal principles and definitions, ignoring other elements essential to the generation of moral norms. Using Kant as a foil, I argue that formal principles and definitions are insufficient to deliver our basic moral code. An additional element, content, those basic contingent facts about our nature and the contingent conditions of our environment, is required before formal principles and definitions can determine our actual obligations. ;If we offer God's will as the explanation for the contentual aspect of morality, we both have a sufficient basis to explain or account for our basic moral norms and a way in which Socrates' challenge to Euthyphro can be met. God's creation of the world supplies the content necessary for otherwise empty formal principles and definitions to operate. Thus God's will is hardly irrelevant. Formal limits on God's willing insure that his will will not be arbitrary, that it will be consistent with love, goodness, rationality, etc., but it is now clear that these principles or definitions alone are not fully determinative of our obligations. Thus God's will is effective but not arbitrary. The Euthyphro dilemma is solved and a much needed corrective is applied to moral theory in general