Testimony as Joint Activity

Dissertation, University of Miami (2023)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Testimony is of epistemic and practical significance. It is of epistemic significance because majority of what we know and believe comes from being told. It is of practical significance because our agency can be undermined, bypassed, or overridden owing to systemic prejudices sustained by oppressive social or cultural practices and subsequently our routes to knowledge are either hindered or distorted. Things get more complicated when we introduce and examine how groups and other collectives testify and are recipients of testimony. For instance, group speakers are typically said to represent and reflect the view of the group they are speaking on behalf of. But sometimes because of these oppressive practices, a group speaker’s assertion may deprive or impair its members’ ability to perform certain actions through speech. This dissertation examines the intersection between testimony, collective phenomena, and epistemic harms. One aim is to argue for a view on the nature of testimony that can accommodate various ways collectives testify and are recipients of testimony. In particular, I argue and present a view of testimony as a norm-governed joint activity involving individual or collective participants that commit themselves to a common aim of collaboration. Another aim is to present an epistemology of testimony that tracks our ordinary testimonial practices. In this regard, I argue for a norm view where we have reason to believe what we’re told because of the rules or norms that govern our communicative exchanges. A final aim is to explore the mechanism by which collective speech ensues in an epistemic harm driven by social identity prejudices. I argue for a form of silencing that is distinctive of groups insofar as the silencing occurs because of group dynamics. I call the mechanism underlying this form of silencing “representational impairment”. This dissertation, I hope, will motivate and inspire others to pursue philosophical projects at these intersections and in this spirit, I end by offering suggestions on areas of further development and future direction.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

The Epistemology of Collective Testimony.Leo Townsend - 2021 - Journal of Social Ontology.
Group testimony.Deborah Tollefsen - 2007 - Social Epistemology 21 (3):299 – 311.
Group Testimony: Defending a Reductionist View.Domingos Faria - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (3):283-304.
Testimony and the Constitutive Norm of Assertion.Casey Rebecca Johnson - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):356-375.
Trust and commitment in collective testimony.Leo Townsend - 2020 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 39-58.
Narrative testimony.Rachel Fraser - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):4025-4052.
How to Be a Pessimist about Aesthetic Testimony.Robert Hopkins - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (3):138-157.

Analytics

Added to PP
2023-06-11

Downloads
315 (#86,771)

6 months
86 (#70,457)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Nicolas Nicola
Brandon University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references