Philosophy of Emotions

Abstract

In the epistemological context, two questions have a special relevance: "are emotions knowledge?" and "is a uniform theory of emotions necessary to evaluate the epistemological state of emotions?". A restrictive interpretation of "knowledge" requires theories to have propositional content. In such a case, emotions are usually assimilated to normative beliefs or judgments. More liberal interpretations of "knowledge" also include theories that interpret emotions on the perception model. A minimal definition of cognitive theories of emotions includes the assertion that emotions are intentional. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.11326.72004

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Nicolae Sfetcu
Romanian Academy

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References found in this work

The expression of the emotions in man and animal.Charles Darwin - 1890 - Mineola, New York: Dover Publications. Edited by Francis Darwin.
Action, Emotion And Will.Anthony Kenny - 1963 - Ny: Humanities Press.
Love and knowledge: Emotion in feminist epistemology.Alison M. Jaggar - 1989 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):151 – 176.

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