Agent-relativity and deontology

Abstract

In this chapter I want to take up some of the problems that must be faced by any defender of the objectivity of ethics who wishes to make sense of the actual complexity of the subject. The treatment will be general and very incomplete. Essentially I shall discuss some examples in order to suggest that the enterprise is not hopeless.

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Thomas Nagel
New York University

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Preference and urgency.T. M. Scanlon - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):655-669.
The Rejection of Consequentialism.Barry R. Gross - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (4):696-698.

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