Abstract

There is a problem within contractarian ethics that I wish to resolve. It concerns individual preferences. Contractarianism holds that morality, properly conceived, can satisfy individual preferences and interests better than amorality or immorality. What is unclear, however, is whether these preferences are those individuals actually hold or those that they should hold. The goal of my thesis is to investigate this question. I introduce a version of contractarian ethics that relies on individual preferences in a manner more stringent than has been in the literature to date. "Occurrent contractarianism," as I have called it, is rooted in our social-psychological state. Given the characteristics we have, and given the social situation in which we are embedded, the best resolve we have of furthering our individually defined preferences is to adopt and adhere to a moral system. Occurrent contractarianism remains true to the original contractarian insight; that morality is a rational institution, capable of being designed for and adhered to even by non-tuistic rational beings following merely their own occurrent preferences