Comparative and Critical Study of the Concept of Freedom in the thought of Kant and Heidegger

Journal of Philosophical Investigations 16 (39):643-657 (2022)
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Abstract

In a sense, freedom is one of the most important concepts in the history of philosophy, which plays a fundamental role in the thought of philosophers, but like many other concepts, it needs to be redefined in order to survive in new conditions. Based on this, this article aims to compare Kant's and Heidegger's viewpoints and take some serious criticisms into consideration in order to take a preliminary step towards redefining the concept of freedom. Kant considers freedom to be a metaphenomenal matter and a fundamental characteristic of the subject. And he introduces it as the foundation of ethics. He chooses the positive meaning of freedom that emerges in the shadow of human socialization and makes it the basis of his thought. But it must be said that firstly, it is true that moral laws are issued by us, but acting on them is optional. Secondly, a person is more a social product than the result of the pure form of the moral law and the rule of refusal of the society of contrarians. On the contrary, Heidegger believes Dasein is the essence of transcending itself and existential transcendence, and this is the basis of freedom. Therefore, the (external) existence of Dasein is essentially the essence of freedom. But first of all, Heidegger's method in describing the way of human existence is neutral towards the way of life. Second, Heidegger's view on freedom does not help to live freely, nor does it show a solution for it. Thirdly, this view shows another role and society in living freely ignores and relies only on the individual Dasein. Fourthly, freedom has no relationship with satisfaction and happiness. Therefore, freedom does not mean getting rid of causal-disabled determinism, but it means making it naked.

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