Heidegger’s Interpretation of Freedom in Kant’s Philosophy

Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 11 (43-44):163-173 (2010)
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Abstract

This essay tries to explain the place of original freedom in Kant’s thought according to Heidegger’s interpretation. Original freedom, according to Heidegger, is based on transcendence. Human beings can transcendent from beings level to being only due to their special relation to being and with this transcendence they can release themselves from everydayness. Kant, according to Heidegger, was aware that human essence is in its transcendence and he based his critique in every three realm of pure reason and practical reason and judgment on this truth. In the first critique, that is, in cognition, this truth is appeared as cognition requires pre-conceptual comprehension of beings, in ethics the freedom is disclosed in self-submission to the moral law and spontaneity of will. But in appreciation, freedom is not limited to any limit and condition. In other word freedom is released from limitation of concepts and purpose, possession and desires, and pre-determined laws. So in art realm, freedom is original freedom. The ontology of appreciation is thus central to the critique of judgment and to the ontology of knowledge and ethics, because appreciation fully discloses, through joy full participation in the harmony, the ground of the pure reason, practical reason and judgment.

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